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ABSTRACT
Different beliefs about how fair social competition is and what determines income inequality,
influence the redistributive policy chosen democratically in a society. But the composition of income
in the first place depends on equilibrium tax policies. If a society believes that individual effort
determines income, and that all have a right to enjoy the fruits of their effort, it will chose low
redistribution and low taxes. In equilibrium effort will be high, the role of luck limited, market
outcomes will be quite fair, and social beliefs will be self-fulfilled. If instead a society believes that
luck, birth, connections and/or corruption determine wealth, it will tax a lot, thus distorting
allocations and making these beliefs self-sustained as well. We show how this interaction between
social beliefs and welfare policies may lead to multiple equilibria or multiple steady states. We argue
that this model can contribute to explain US vis a vis continental European perceptions about income
inequality and choices of redistributive policies.
Alberto Alesina George-Marios Angeletos
Department of Economics Department of Economics
Harvard University MIT
Cambridge, MA 02138 50 Memorial Drive, E52-251
and NBER Cambridge, MA 02142
aalesina@harvard.edu angelet@mit.eduA. Alesina and G.M. Angeletos
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Pre-tax inequality is higher in the United States than in continental Western European
countries (“Europe” in short). For example, the Gini coeﬃcient in the pre-tax income
distribution in the United States is 38.5 against 29.1 in Europe. Nevertheless, redistribu-
tive policies are more extensive in Europe. The income tax structure is more progressive
in Europe, and the overall size of government is about 50 per cent larger in Europe than
in the United States (that is, about 30 versus about 45 per cent of GDP). The largest
diﬀerence is indeed in transfers and other social beneﬁts, where Europeans spend about
twice as much as Americans. Moreover, the public budget is only one of the means to
support the poor; an important dimension of redistribution is legislation, and in particular
the regulation of labor and product markets, which are much more intrusive in Europe
than in the United States.1
The coexistence of high pre-tax inequality and low redistribution is prima facia in-
consistent with either the Meltzer-Richard paradigm of redistribution, or the Mirrlees
paradigm of social insurance. Instead, the diﬀerence in the political support for redistri-
bution appears to reﬂect, at least in part, a diﬀerence in social perceptions regarding the
fairness of market outcomes and the underlying sources of income inequality. More Amer-
icans than Europeans believe that poverty is due to bad choices or lack of eﬀort rather
than bad luck or social injustice; Europeans view poverty as a trap from which it is hard
to escape. Americans perceive wealth and success as the outcome of individual talent,
eﬀort, and entrepreneurship; Europeans attribute a larger role to luck and connections.
According to the World Values Survey,7 1 per cent of Americans versus 40 per cent of
Europeans believe that the poor could become rich if they just tried hard enough; and a
larger proportion of Europeans than Americans believe that luck and connections, rather
than hard work, determine economic success.
The eﬀect of social beliefs about how fair market outcomes are on actual policy choices
is not limited to a comparison of the United States and Europe. Figure 1 shows a strong
positive correlation between a country’s GDP share of social spending and its’ belief that
1Alesina and Glaeser (2003) document extensively the sharp diﬀerences in redistribution between the
United States and Europe.
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luck and connections determine income. This correlation is easy to interpret if political
outcomes reﬂect a social desire for fairness. But, why do diﬀerent counties have so diﬀerent
perceptions about the fairness of market outcomes? Who is right, the Americans who
think that eﬀort determines success, or the Europeans who think that it is mostly luck?
[insert Figure 1 here]
In this paper we show that, in equilibrium, it can be the case that luck is more
important in one place, while eﬀort is more important in another place, even if there are
no intrinsic diﬀerences in economic fundamentals between the two places. Both Americans
and Europeans can thus be correct in their beliefs about what are the sources of income
inequality. The key element in our analysis is the idea of “social justice” or “fairness”.
With these terms we capture a social preference for reducing the degree of inequality
induced by luck and unworthy activities, while rewarding individual talent and eﬀort.
Since the society can not tell apart the part of an individual’s income that is due to
luck and unworthy activities (the “noise” in the income distribution) from the part that
is due to talent and eﬀort (the “signal”), the socially optimal level of redistribution is
decreasing in the “signal-to-noise ratio” in the income distribution (the ratio of justiﬁable
to unjustiﬁable inequality). Higher taxation, on the other hand, distorts private incentives
and leads to lower eﬀort and investment. As a result, the equilibrium signal-to-noise ratio
in the income distribution is itself decreasing in the level of redistribution. This interaction
between the level of redistribution and the composition of inequality may lead to multiple
equilibria. In the one equilibrium, taxes are higher, individuals invest and work less,
and inequality is lower; but a relative large share of total income is due to luck, which
in turn makes high redistribution socially desirable. In the other equilibrium, taxes are
lower, individuals invest and work more, and inequality is higher; but a larger fraction of
income is due to eﬀort rather than luck, which in turn sustains the lower tax rates as an
equilibrium.
We should be clear from the outset that we do not mean to argue that “fundamentals”
between Europe and the United States are identical, or that the multiplicity of equilibria
we identify in our benchmark model is the only source of the politico-economic diﬀer-
ences across the two sides of the Atlantic. Our multiple-equilibria mechanism should be
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interpreted more generally as a propagation mechanism that can help explain large and
persistent diﬀerences in social outcomes on the basis of small diﬀerences in underlying
fundamentals, initial conditions, or shocks.
How the diﬀerent historical experiences of the two places (which by now are largely
hard-wired in the diﬀerent cultures of the two places) may explain the diﬀerent attitudes
and policies towards inequality, is indeed in the heart of our argument. In a dynamic
variant of our model, we consider the implications of the fact that wealth is transmitted
from one generation to the next through bequests or other shorts of parental investment.
The distribution of wealth in one generation now depends, not only on the contribution
of eﬀort and luck in that generation, but also on the contribution of eﬀort and luck in all
previous generations. As a result, how fair the wealth distribution is in one period, and
what is the optimal redistributive policy in that period, depend on the history of policies
and outcomes in all past periods. We conclude that the diﬀerences in perceptions, atti-
tudes, and policies towards inequality (or more generally towards the market mechanism)
across the two sides of the Atlantic can be understood on the basis of diﬀerent initial
conditions and diﬀerent historical coincidences.2
Following Rawls (1971) and Mirrlees (1971), fairness has been modeled before as a
demand for insurance. However, the standard Mirrlees paradigm does not incorporate
a distinction between justiﬁable and unjustiﬁable inequality, which is the heart of our
approach.3 Other papers have discussed multiple equilibria in related models. In Piketty
(1995), multiple beliefs are possible because agents form their beliefs only on the basis of
their personal experience and can not learn the true costs and beneﬁts of redistribution.
In Benabou and Tirole (2002), multiple beliefs are possible because agents ﬁnd it optimal
to deliberately bias their own perception of the truth so as to oﬀset another bias, namely
procrastination.4 Finally, in Benabou (2000), multiplicity originates in imperfect credit
2Alesina and Glaeser (2003) describe how a transatlantic diﬀerence in the evolution of the welfare
state dates back to its origin.
3See, however, Amador, Angeletos and Werning (2003) and the concluding remark in Section 6.
4Benabou and Tirole (2002) endogenize the choice of political ideology and more speciﬁcally the choice
of whether to “believe to a just world”. Their work shares some common motivation with ours, but their
contribution developed independently and is rather orthogonal to ours. In their model, but not in ours,
people suﬀer from procrastination and lack of self control. At the same time, they have the ability to
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and insurance markets. In our paper, instead, multiplicity originates merely in the social
desire to implement fair economic outcomes and survives even when beliefs are fully
unbiased, agents know the truth, and there are no important diﬀerences in capital markets
or other economic fundamentals.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews some evidence on
fairness and redistribution, which motivate our modelling approach. Section 3 introduces
the basic static model. Section 4 analyzes the interaction of economic and voting choices
and derives the two regimes as multiple static equilibria. Section 5 introduces intergener-
ational links and derives the two regimes as multiple steady states. Section 6 concludes.
All formal proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Fairness and Redistribution: a few facts
Our crucial assumption is that agents expect the society to reward individual eﬀort and
hard work and the government to intervene and correct market outcomes to the extent
that outcomes are driven by luck. The available empirical evidence is supportive of this
assumption.5
Fairness and preferences for redistribution. The eﬀect of social beliefs about
what determines income (luck or eﬀort) on actual policy choices is not limited to a com-
parison of the United States versus Europe. Figure 1, which is reproduced from Alesina
Glaeser and Sacerdote (2001), shows a strong positive correlation between the share of
social spending over GDP and the percentage of respondents to the World Values Survey
who think that income is determined mostly by luck. As Table 1 shows, this correlation is
robust to controlling for the Gini coeﬃcient, per-capita GDP, and continent dummies. It
is also robust to controlling for two political variables, the nature of the electoral system
repress past experiences and thereby distort their own beliefs regarding what are the returns to individual
eﬀort. Given that the ex-post optimal level of eﬀort is ineﬃciently low from an ex-ante perspective, people
ﬁnd it optimal ex ante to maintain a more “rosy” picture about the beneﬁts of eﬀort in order to “deceive”
themselves into putting more eﬀort ex post.
5Complementary is also the evidence that fairness concerns aﬀect labor relations (Kahneman, Knetsch,
and Thaler, 1986; Agell and Lundborg, 1995; Bewley, 1999).
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and Presidential versus parliamentary regime, which may inﬂuence the size of transfers,
as argued by Persson and Tabellini (2003).6
[insert Table 1 here]
The impact of fairness perceptions is evident, not only in aggregate outcomes, but
also in individual attitudes. The World Values Survey asks the respondent whether he
identiﬁes himself as being on the left of the political spectrum. We take this “leftist
political orientation” as a proxy for favoring redistribution and government intervention.
We then regress this variable against the individual’s belief about what determines income
together with a series of individual- and country-speciﬁc controls. As Table 2 shows, the
belief that luck determines income has a strong and signiﬁcant eﬀect on the probability
of being leftist. Further evidence is provided by Fong (2002), Corneo and Gruner (2002),
and Alesina and La Ferrara (2003). Using the General Social Survey for the United
States, the latter study ﬁnds that individuals who think that income is determined by
luck, connections, and family history rather than individual eﬀort, education, and ability,
are much more favorable to redistribution, even after controlling for an exhaustive set of
other individual characteristics.
[insert Table 2 here]
Experimental evidence. Fehr and Schmidt (2001) provide an extensive review of
the experimental evidence on altruism, reciprocity, and fairness. In dictator games, people
give a small portion of their endowment to others, even though they could keep it all. In
ultimatum games, people are ready to suﬀer a monetary loss themselves just to punish
behavior that is considered “unfair”. In gift exchange games, on the other hand, people
are willing to suﬀer a loss in order to reward actions that they perceive as generous or
fair. Finally, in public good games, cooperators tend to punish free-riders. These ﬁndings
6The correlation looses some signiﬁcance if one controls for the population share of the old, which
is because the size of pensions depends heavily on this variable. However, the pension system is much
more redistributive in Europe than in the United States (Alesina and Glaeser, 2003). Also the correlation
between transfer payments and beliefs in luck remains very strong once we exclude pensions. More details
are available in the working paper version of the paper.
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are very robust to changes in the size of monetary stakes or the background of players.
In short, there is plenty experimental evidence that people have an innate desire for
fairness, and are ready to punish unfair behavior. What is more, the existing evidence
rejects the hypothesis that altruism takes merely the form of absolute inequity aversion.
People instead appear to desire equality relative to some reference point, namely what
they consider as a “fair” outcome.
Further support in favor of our concept of fairness is provided by the evidence that
experimental outcomes are sensitive to whether initial endowments are assigned randomly
or as a function of previous achievement. In ultimatum games, Hoﬀman and Spitzer (1985)
and Hoﬀman et al. (1998) ﬁnd that proposers are more likely to make unequal oﬀers, and
responders are less likely to reject unequal oﬀers, when the proposers have outscored the
respondents in a preceding trivia quiz, and even more if they have been explicitly told
that they have “earned” their roles in the ultimatum game on the basis of their preceding
performance. In double auction games, Ball et al. (1996) report a similar sensitivity of
the division of surplus between buyers and sellers on whether market status is random or
earned. Finally, in a public good game where groups of people with unequal endowments
vote over two alternative contribution schemes, Clark (1998) ﬁnds that members of a
group are more likely to vote for the scheme that eﬀectively redistributes less from the
rich to the poor members of the same group, when initial endowments depend on previous
relative performance in a general-knowledge quiz rather than been randomly assigned.
Psychologists, sociologists and political scientists have also stressed the importance
of a sense of fairness in the private, social and political life of men. People enjoy great
satisfaction when they know (or believe) that they live in a just world, where hard work
and good behavior ultimately pay oﬀ.7 In short, it is a fundamental conviction that one
should get what he deserves and, conversely, that one should deserve whatever he gets.
7What is more, people may actually distort their perception or interpretation of reality in order to
maintain their belief to a just world; see Lerner (1982) and Benabou and Tirole (2002).
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3T h e B a s i c M o d e l
Consider a non-overlapping generation model, in which each generation consists of a large
number of agents (a [0,1] continuum), who live for two periods. In each period of life,
agents engage in a productive activity, which can be interpreted as labor supply, accu-
mulation of physical or human capital, entrepreneurship, etc.. The tax and redistributive
policy is set in the middle of their life. (These assumptions about the timing of economic
and political decisions are made only to ensure that part of agents’ wealth is ﬁxed when
the policy is chosen.) Agents are not altruistic towards future generations and consume all
their disposable income at the end of their life. As there are no links across generations,
the economy is essentially static, and we can characterize politico-economic outcomes in
one generation without reference to any other generation. (We consider inter-generational
links later, in Section 5.)
3.1 Heterogeneity, technologies, and preferences
The investment and productive activities of the ﬁrst period of life require eﬀort. Life-cycle
income, or wealth, is the combined outcome of inherent talent, investment during the ﬁrst
period of life, eﬀort during the second period of life, and luck:
yi = Ai[αki +( 1− α)ei]+ηi. (1)
yi denotes income, ki investment in the ﬁrst period of life, and ei eﬀort in the second
period of life.8 α ∈ (0,1) is a technological constant, which can be interpreted as the
share of income that is sunk when the tax rate is set.9 Finally, ηi is i.i.d. noise, which we
interpret as random luck or the eﬀect of socially unworthy activities, such as corruption,
rent seeking, political subversion, theft, fraud, etc.10
8If we interpret ki as a form of human capital, ki and ei are likely to be complements; such comple-
mentarities would complicate the algebra but would not matter for our results. Also, the possibility that
productivity and human capital reﬂect family background, is examined in Section 5.
9As shown later on, α>0 is essential for the possibility of multiple equilibria, whereas α<1 simply
ensures that τ =1is never an equilibrium.
10See the working-paper version of this article for a vairant of our model where exogenous “luck” is
replaced by an endogenous rent-seeking activity.
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Consumption, or disposable income, is given by
ci =( 1− τ)yi + G, (2)
where τ is the ﬂat-rate tax imposed on wealth and G is a lump sum transfer. This
redistributive scheme is widely used in the literature following Romer (1975) and Meltzer
and Richard (1981), because it is the simplest one to model. The qualitative nature of
our message is not unduly sensitive to the precise nature of this scheme.11
Individual preferences are given by
Ui = ui − γΩ, (3)
where ui represents the private utility from own consumption, investment, and eﬀort
choices, Ω represents the common disutility generated by unfair social outcomes (to be
deﬁned below), and γ ≥ 0 parametrizes the strength of the social demand for fairness. To
simplify, we specify










The ﬁrst term represents the utility of consumption. The second term represents the
costs of ﬁrst-period investment and second-period eﬀort. βi parametrizes the willingness
to postpone consumption and work hard: a low βi captures impatience or laziness, a high
βi captures “care for the future” or “love for work”. If agents suﬀered from procrastination
and hyperbolic discounting, βi could also be interpreted as the degree of self control.12
Finally, the coeﬃcients α/2 and (1 − α)/2 are merely a normalization.
3.2 Fairness, government, and equilibrium
Following the evidence in Section 2 that most people share a common conviction that one




(ui − b ui)
2, (4)
11See the remarks in Sections 4.1 and 6.
12In that case, we would need to distinguish between ex ante and ex post preferences. For example,
we could let βi =1for all i ex ante, whereas βi ≤ 1 for all i and Va r(βi) > 0 ex post. For an elegant
model where the anticipation of procrastination aﬀects also the choice of ideology, see Benabou and Tirole
(2002).
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where ui denotes the actual level of utility and b ui denotes the “fair” level of utility. The
latter is deﬁned as the utility the agent deserves on the basis of his talent and eﬀort,
namely b ui = Vi(b ci,k i,e i) where
b ci = b yi = Ai[αki +( 1− α)ei]. (5)
represent the “fair” levels of consumption and income. Similarly, the residual yi −b yi = ηi
measures the “unfair” component of income.
Because utility is quasilinear in consumption, ui−b ui = ci−b ci for every i, and therefore
Ω =
R




{[(1 − τ)yi + τy] − b yi}
2 . (6)
In the absence of government intervention, Ω would reduce to Ω =
R
i(yi − b yi)2, thus
measuring how unfair is the pre-tax income distribution; in the presence of government
intervention, Ω measures how unfair economic outcomes remain after redistribution.
The government chooses the tax rate τ ∈ [0,1] and the level of spending G, subject to
the budget constraint G = τy, where y ≡
R
i yi is the average income in the population.
Because fairness is a public good, it is not essential for our results how exactly individual
preferences are aggregated into political choices about redistribution: No matter what is
the weight of diﬀerent agents in the political process, the concern for fairness will always
be reﬂected in political choices. To be consistent with the related literature, we assume
that the preferences of the government coincide with those of the median voter.13
For future reference, we let δi ≡ A2
iβi, assume Cov(δi,η i)=0 , and denote σ2
δ ≡
Va r(δi),σ 2
η ≡ Va r(ηi), and ∆ ≡ δm − δ ≥ 0,w h e r eδm and δ are the median and the
mean of δi. There two sources of support for redistribution in the model. One is the
standard “selﬁsh” redistribution a la Meltzer and Richard (1981), which arises if and only
∆ > 0. The other is the “altruistic” redistribution originating in the desire to correct for
the eﬀect of luck on income, which arrises if and only if γ>0.
Deﬁnition. The economy is parametrized by E ≡ (∆,γ,α,σδ,ση). An equilibrium is
at a xr a t eτ and a collection of individual plans {ki,e i}i∈[0,1] such that (i) the plan
13As shown in the Appendix, maxi{δi} ≤ 2δ actually suﬃces for preferences to be single-picked in τ
and thus for the median-voter theorem to apply.
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(ki,e i) maximizes the utility of agent i for every i, and (ii) the tax rate τ maximizes
the utility of the median agent.
4 Equilibrium Analysis
4.1 Fairness and singal extraction
Suppose that yi − b yi is independent of b yi; this will turn to be true in equilibrium if and
only if ηi is independent of δi, which we have assumed for simplicity. Then, from (6) we
obtain social injustice as a weighted average of the “variance decomposition” of income
inequality:
Ω = τ
2Va r(b yi)+( 1− τ)
2Va r(yi − b yi), (7)
where Va rdenotes variance in the cross-section of agents. Note that the weights depend
on the level of redistribution, namely τ. If minimizing Ω were the only policy goal, taxation
were not distortionary, and the income distribution were exogenous, the equilibrium tax





Va r(yi − b yi)
. (8)
The right-hand side represents a “signal-to-noise ratio” in the income distribution: The
“signal” is the fair component of income and the “noise” is the eﬀect of luck. As the
goal of redistribution is to correct for the eﬀect of luck on income, the optimal tax rate is
decreasing is this signal-to-noise ratio.
Remark. The implicit assumption that motivates the restriction of policy to a linear
income (or wealth) tax is that (yi,c i) are publicly observable, but (Ai,βi,ηi) and thus
(ki,e i,b yi,b ci) are private information to agent i. That is, the society observes the total
income of each agent, but can not tell whether this income is the fruits of talent and
eﬀort or the outcome of pure luck (or corruption, rent seeking, etc.). As a result, the
society necessarily faces the singal-extraction problem identiﬁed above when seeking to
determine the optimal level of redistribution. This property is likely to survive even if we
allowed for a general non-linear tax a la Mirrlees.14
14See Amador, Angeletos, and Werning (2003) and the concluding remark in Section 6.
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4.2 The equilibrium signal-to-noise ratio
Consider the investment and eﬀort decisions of agent i.H e c h o o s e s ki and ei so as to
maximize











taking τ and G as given. Since agents choose ki before τ is ﬁxed, ﬁrst-period investment is
a function of the anticipated tax rate and is sunk when the actual tax rate is chosen. On
the other hand, agents choose second-period eﬀort ei ex post, contingent on the realized
tax and the investment they made before. To distinguish the anticipated tax rate from
the realized one, we henceforth denote the former by τe and the latter by τ. (Of course,
τe = τ in any perfect-foresight equilibrium, but we adopt the diﬀerent notation for the
shake of clarity.)
The ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to ki and ei imply
ki =( 1− τe)βiAi and ei =( 1− τ)βiAi. (10)
Substituting into (5), we conclude
b yi =[ 1− ατe − (1 − α)τ]δi, (11)
where δi ≡ βiA2
i. Therefore, exogenous heterogeneity in either talent (Ai) or impatience
and laziness (βi) translates to endogenous heterogeneity in in the fair component of income
(b yi). It follows that the equilibrium signal-to-noise ratio in the income distribution is
Va r(b yi)
Va r(yi − b yi)







δ ≡ Va r(δi) ≡ Va r(βiA2
i) and σ2
η ≡ Va r(ηi). We conclude that, in equilibrium,
the signal-to-noise ratio in the income distribution is decreasing in the tax rate, reﬂecting
the distortionary eﬀect of taxation.
Remark. The critical features of the model that generate equilibrium multiplicity are
(i) that the optimal tax rate is decreasing in the signal-to-noise ratio and (ii) that the
equilibrium signal-to-noise ratio is in turn decreasing in the tax rate. To deliver the second
feature, we have chosen a simple speciﬁcation for income in which “luck” enters additively
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a n dt h u sd o e sn o ti n t e r a c tw i t he ﬀort or investment. Nevertheless, this simpliﬁcation
per se is not essential. What is essential is that higher taxes, by distorting eﬀort and
investment, result to a reduction in the level of justiﬁable inequality relative to the level
of unjustiﬁable inequality. For this to be true, it is necessary and suﬃcient that higher
taxes distort the fair sources of income more than the unfair sources,15 which we believe
to be a very plausible hypothesis. Actually, if “luck” represents the output of tax evasion,
corruption, and political connections, it is even likely that higher government intervention
increases the absolute contribution of “luck”, in which case the negative eﬀect of the tax
rate on the signal-to-noise ratio is reinforced. Finally, note that, in our model, the role
of heterogeneity in Ai and/or βi is to generate endogenous variation in the “fair” level of
income. Endogenizing the concept of fairness, and understanding why societies consider
some sources of inequality as justiﬁable and others as unfair, is an exciting direction for
future research, but it is beyond the scope of this paper.
4.3 The optimal policy
The optimal policy maximizes the utility of the median voter. Assuming that luck has zero
mean and median, the median voter, denoted by i = m, is an agent with characteristics
δm = median(δi) and ηm =0 . Letting ∆ ≡ δ − δm and normalizing δm =2 , the utility of
the median voter in equilibrium reduces to16
Um =( 1− ατ
2
e) − (1 − α)τ
2 +[ 1− ατe − (1 − α)τ]τ∆ − γΩ. (13)
The ﬁrst and second terms in (13) capture the welfare losses due to the distortion of
ﬁrst-period investment and second-period eﬀort, respectively. The third term measures
the net transfer the median voter enjoys from the tax system, reﬂecting the fact that
a positive tax rate eﬀectively redistributes from the mean to the median of the income
distribution. This term introduces a “selﬁsh” motive for redistribution as in Meltzer and
Richard (1981). The last term instead captures the “altruistic” motive originating in the
15For example, if income were yi = Ai[αki +( 1− α)ei]+ηi[αki +(1− α)ei]φ, the signal-to-noise ratio
would decrease with the tax rate if and only if φ<1.
16See the Appendix for the derivation of (13).
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social concern for fairness. From (7) and (11), the equilibrium value of Ω is
Ω = τ
2[1 − ατe − (1 − α)τ]
2σ
2





δ = Va r(δi) and σ2
η = Va r(ηi). Note that Ω depends on both τe and τ.T h e
negative dependence on τe reﬂects the fact that the anticipation of high taxation, by
distorting ﬁrst-period incentives, results to a large relative contribution of luck to income.
The dependence on τ reﬂects a similar distortion of second-period incentives, but also the
property that, keeping the pre-tax income distribution constant, more redistribution may
correct for the eﬀect of luck, thus obtaining a fairer distribution of after-tax disposable
income. Finally, note that that τe is taken as given when τ is set, reﬂecting the fact that
the agents’ ﬁrst-period investments are sunk.17 We conclude:
Proposition 1 When the ex-ante anticipated policy is τe, the ex-post optimal policy is
τ = f(τe;E), where
f(τe;E) ≡ argminτ∈[0,1]
©








If γ = ∆ =0 , then f =0 .I f∆ > 0 but γ =0 , then f>0 and ∂f/∂∆ > 0, but ∂f/∂σδ =
∂f/∂ση =0and ∂f/∂τe < 0.F i n a l l y ,i fγ>0, then f>0 and ∂f/∂ση > 0 necessarily;
∂f/∂σδ < 0 and ∂f/∂∆ > 0, unless both ση and τe are too high; and ∂f/∂τe > 1 for low
τe when γ and α are suﬃciently high.
The intuition of these results is simple. If there is neither a concern for fairness (γ =0 ) ,
nor a diﬀerence between the mean and the median of the income distribution (∆ =0 ) , the
optimal tax is zero, as redistribution has only costs and no beneﬁts from the perspective
of the median voter. When the median is poorer than the mean (∆ > 0), the Meltzer-
Richard eﬀect kicks in, implying that the optimal tax rate is positive and increasing in
∆. N e v e r t h e l e s s ,a sl o n ga st h et h e r ei sn od e m a n df o rf a i r n e s s(γ =0 ) , the optimal tax
remains independent of the sources of income inequality. Moreover, the ex-post optimal
policy is decreasing in the ex-ante anticipated policy, as a higher distortion of ﬁrst-period
17In other words, the median voter lacks commitment. In Sections 4.5 and 5, we explain why commit-
ment is irrelevant for our results once intergenerational links are introduced.
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incentives reduces the income diﬀerence between the mean and the median and therefore
also reduces the beneﬁt of redistribution from the perspective of the median voter.
Things are quite diﬀerent when the society desires fair economic outcomes (γ>0).
The society then seeks a positive level of redistribution in order to correct for the undesir-
able eﬀect of luck on income inequality. As a result, the optimal tax is positive even if the
median and the mean of the population coincide (∆ =0 ) . The optimal tax then trades
less eﬃciency for more fairness. As ση increases, more of the observed income inequality
originates in luck, which implies a higher optimal tax rate. The opposite consideration
holds for higher σδ, as this implies a larger relative contribution of ability and eﬀort in
income inequality. Finally, the relationship between τe and τ is generally non-monotonic.
To understand this non-monotonicity, note that an increase in τe has an unambiguous ad-
verse eﬀect on the fairness of the income distribution, as it distorts ﬁrst-period incentives.
An increase in τ, instead, has two opposing eﬀects. On the one hand, like in the case
of τe, ah i g h e rτ reduces the “fair” component of income variation, because it distorts
second-period incentives. On the other hand, a higher τ redistributes more from the poor
to the rich and may thus “correct” for the eﬀect of luck. When τe is small, the second
eﬀect dominates; τ increases with τe in order to expand redistribution and thus “correct”
for the relatively larger eﬀect of luck. When instead τe is high, the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates;
τ falls with τe in order to encourage more eﬀort and thus “substitute” for the adverse
eﬀect of a higher τe.
4.4 Multiple equilibria
In equilibrium, expectations must be validated, which means τe = τ. The equilibrium
set thus coincides with the set of ﬁxed points of the function f. We have shown that
the optimal level of redistribution is decreasing in the signal-to-noise ratio in the income
distribution, reﬂecting the demand for fairness, and that the signal-to-noise ratio in turn
is decreasing in the level of redistribution, reﬂecting the distortionary eﬀect of taxation.
We now establish that this interaction between the policy and the composition of income
inequality may lead to multiple equilibria.
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Proposition 2 A ne q u i l i b r i u ma l w a y se x i s t sa n dc o r r e s p o n d st oa n yﬁxed point of f,
where f is given by (15). If γ =0 , there is a unique equilibrium, in which τ ∈ [0,1)
and τ is increasing in ∆ and independent of σδ and ση. If instead γ>0, there genericly
exist multiple equilibria. In any stable equilibrium, the tax rate is τ ∈ (0,1), necessarily
increasing in ση, and decreasing in σδ and increasing in ∆, unless both ση and τ are too
high. Finally, the equilibrium with the lowest tax is the one with the highest inequality but
also the highest singnal-to-noise ratio.
Therefore, if there is no (or little) social concern for fairness, there is a unique equi-
librium, like in the standard Meltzer-Richard framework. But if γ is suﬃciently high, the
economy is prone to multiple equilibria. The possibility of multiple equilibria is illustrated
in Figure 2.18 The solid curve depicts the best-response function (15). Note that, if γ were
close to zero, this curve would be globally decreasing, and thus would necessarily intersect
only once with the 45-degree line. But now that γ is suﬃciently high, this curve has ﬁrst
an increasing portion, which opens the door to multiple equilibria. Indeed, the curve
intersects three times with the 45o line. The extreme two intersection points (US and
EU) represent stable equilibria, while the middle one represents an unstable equilibrium,
which we disregard.19 In point EU, the anticipation of high taxes induces agents to exert
little eﬀort in the ﬁrst period. This in turn implies that the bulk of income heterogeneity
is due to luck and makes it ex post optimal for society to undertake large redistributive
programs, thus vindicating initial expectations. In point US, instead, the anticipation of
low taxes induces agents to exert high eﬀort and implies that income variation is mostly
the outcome of heterogeneity in talent and eﬀort, which in turn makes low redistribution
self-sustained in the political process. What is more, the level of inequality (as measured
by the total variance of income) is lowest in EU, but the decomposition of inequality (as
measured by the signal-to-noise ratio) is fairest in US,which explains why more inequality
18The example is only illustrative and claims no quantitative value; it assumes γ =1 , ∆ =0 ,α=1 /2,
σδ =2 .5, and ση =1 .
19Stability is deﬁned in the usual manner: Let f(n) be the n-th order best-responce itteration; that
is, f(1) = f and f(n+1) = f(n) ◦ f for any n ≥ 1. A ﬁxed point τ = f(τ) is locally stable if and only if,
for some ε>0 and any x ∈ (τ − ε,τ + ε), limn→∞ f(n)(x)=τ. Given diﬀerentiability, f0(τ) ∈ (−1,+1)
implies local stability, whereas f0(τ) / ∈ [−1,+1] implies local instability.
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may come together with lower taxes.
[insert Figure 2 here]
As long as there is a suﬃciently strong social demand for fairness and the undesirable
impact of luck is neither too large nor too small as compared to the heterogeneity in
talent and willingness to work, a high- and a low-tax regime are likely to coexist. On the
other hand, if ση/σδ were so large that the eﬀect of luck always dominated the eﬀect of
talent and eﬀort in shaping the income distribution, then only the high-tax regime would
survive. Such a situation is illustrated by the upper dashed line in Figure 2. Finally, if
either γ of ση/σδ were very small, so that there is either little demand for fairness or little
luck to correct, then only the low-tax regime would survive. Such a situation is illustrated
by the lower dashed lined in Figure 2.
The comparative statics with respect to ∆ are also intuitive. Consider ﬁrst the case
that ∆ is suﬃciently close to zero, in which case the altruistic motive originating in fairness
dominates the selﬁs hm o t i v eal aM e l t z e ra n dR i c h a r d .f then increases with ∆, implying
that any stable ﬁxed point of f is locally increasing in ∆.T h i s r e ﬂects simply the fact
that, the poorer the median voter is relatively to the mean, the higher the incentive to
redistribute. As ∆ increases, the optimal tax rate trades less of the public good (fairness)
for more of the private good (self-interest redistribution). When ∆ is suﬃciently large, so
that the selﬁsh motive dominates, only the high-tax regime survives. But otherwise, the
possibility of multiple equilibria remains.
4.5 Comments
The pure Meltzer-Richard model predicts that more inequality is correlated with more re-
distribution. Pure inequity aversion would predict a similar positive correlation. However,
the evidence suggests a negative or null correlation between inequality and redistributive
eﬀort (e.g., Perotti, 1996; Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote, 2001). Our model can deliver
such a negative correlation even after controlling for exogenous fundamentals: In the ex-
ample of Figure 2, US has both a lower τ and a higher Va r(yi) than EU, simply because
lower tax distortions generate higher but also more justiﬁable levels of income inequality.
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The prediction that higher redistribuition should be correlated with higher belief that
income inequality is unfair is clearly consistent with the data, as discussed in Section
2. But, what about the prediction that higher tax distortions should be correlated with
lower levels of eﬀort and investment? As we noted before, tax distortions are much higher
in Europe; the income tax is much more progressive and the total tax burden is about
50 per cent higher than in the United States. At the same time, hours worked are much
lower in Europe. In 2001, the average worked time per employee was about 1200 hours
in Europe as compared to 1600 in the United States. Given the lower labor participation
rate in Europe, the diﬀerence becomes even more striking when measured per person
rather than per employee. Prescott (2003) computes an eﬀective marginal tax on labor
income that properly accounts for consumption taxes and social security contributions.
This measure turns to be about 50 per cent lower in the United States than in France
and Germany. Prescott also notes how the divergence of hours worked in Europe and in
the United States accelerated over time together with the divergence of tax rates across
the Atlantic. He thus concludes that diﬀerences in eﬀective tax rates explains diﬀerences
in labor supply across the two continents.20 Certainly, the higher regulation of labor
markets in Europe also contributes to lower working hours; but regulation is just another
distortionary instrument societies use for the purpose of improving the fairness of mar-
ket outcomes.21 Also consistent with a distortionary eﬀect of taxation is the observation
that growth rates and various measures of investment in intangible capital are higher in
the United States. The United States spend 2.8 per cent of GDP in R&D, while the
15 EU countries spend 1.9 per cent (OECD data, 2001). Moreover, the fraction of this
investment which is private (not government sponsored) is double in the United States.
The percentage of college-educated individuals is 37.3 in the United States as compared
to 18.8 in Europe (OECD data, 2001, individulas between the age of 25 and 64). This
20The elasticity of the labor supply that Prescott (2003) needs in order to attribute all of the diﬀerence
in the working hours to taxes is on the high side of the range obtained by other studies; but, if not all,
certainly a good portion of the diﬀerence in hours worked can be attributed to taxes.
21In addition to these measurable eﬀects of taxation and regulation, there may be other, more subtle
disincentive eﬀects of the welfare state; these may involve changes in social norm that disengage individu-
als from market activities, as argued by Lindbeck, Nyberg and Weibull (1999) in theory and by Lindbeck
et al (1994) as an explanation of the eﬀects of the welfare state in Sweden.
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diﬀerence is even more striking if one considers that, in most European countries, col-
lege education is publicly provided and largely ﬁnanced by general government revenues.
Moreover, the skill premium in wages (the return to human capital) is also much higher
in the United States according to any measure. For example, Table 1 in the recent sur-
vey by Acemoglu (2003) reports that the skill premium of college graduates relative to
high-school graduates is at least 50 per cent higher in the United States that in Europe.22
In short, relative to Europeans, Americans work more, invest more in intangible capital,
obtain higher rewards, and are taxed less.
The two equilibria in Figure 2 can easily be ranked from the perspective of the median
v o t e r :T h eo n ew i t hl o w e rt a x e si ss u p e r i o r ,b e c a u s et h e r ea r el e s sd i s t o r t i o n s ,m o r ei n -
vestment, and more aggregate income; and because income inequality originates relatively
more in ability than in luck, a socially desirable outcome. Poorer agents, however, may
clearly prefer the high-tax equilibrium, as it redistributes more from the rich to the poor.
Also, the high-tax equilibrium provides more insurance against the risk of being born
with low talent or low willingness to work and thus may be preferred behind the veil of
ignorance (that is, before the idiosyncratic shocks are realized and the agents learn their
position in the income distribution).23
Finally, it is of course unrealistic to think that an economy could “jump” from one
regime to another by simply revising equilibrium expectations from one day to another.
In the next section, we consider a dynamic variant of our model, in which history de-
termines what beliefs the society holds and what redistributive policies it selects. The
two regimes then re-emerge as multiple steady states along a unique equilibrium path.
Similarly, whereas only the low-tax regime would survive in the static economy if the
society could credibly commit on its tax policies before agents make their early-in-life
investment choices, such commitment has little bite in the dynamic economy, where the
wealth distribution is largely determined by policies and outcomes in earlier generations.
22For a discussion of how a larger supply of college graduates and a higher skill premium can coexist,
see Acemoglu (1998)
23Risk aversion can be introduced by re-specifying preferences as Ui = Ψ(ui − γΩ), where Ψ is an
increasing and strictly concave function. Since every agent i knows (Ai,βi,ηi) when he makes his choices,
the equilibrium analysis goes through exactly as before, but the ranking of the two equilibria behind the
veil of ingnorance depends on the concavity of Ψ.
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5 Intergenerational Links and History Dependence
One important determinant of wealth and success in life is being born in a wealthy family.
To explore this issue, we now introduce intergenerational wealth transfers and parental
investment (e.g., bequests, education, status, etc.) that link individual income to family
history.24 Since we want to concentrate on the eﬀect of history rather than self-fulﬁlling
expectations, we abstract from investment choices made within a generation before the
tax is set. The optimal policy is then uniquely determined in any given generation, but it
depends on the decomposition of wealth in all previous generations. Finally, to keep the
analysis as smooth as possible, we work out a dynamic model in which the steady-state
analysis turns out to be formally isomorphic to the equilibrium analysis in the benchmark
model. This property, which is not trivial, permits us to translate our earlier multiple-
equilibria result to a result of multiple steady states.
5.1 The environment
The economy is populated by a sequence of non-overlapping generations, indexed by
t ∈ {..,−1,0,1,...}. Each generation lives for one period. Within each generation, there
is a single eﬀort choice, made after the tax is voted on. Parents enjoy utility for leaving a
bequest to their children; by “bequests” we mean, not only monetary transfers, but also
all other sorts of parental investment.25
Let ci
t denote the consumption of family i in generation t,a n dki
t the bequest the































The ﬁrst term in ui
t represents the utility from own consumption and bequests, whereas
24For a recent discussion of the intergenerational transfer of wealth and its eﬀect on eﬀort choices and
entrepreneurship, see Caselli and Gennaioili (2003).
25This is of course a short cut, which is easier to model than adding the utility function of the children
into that of the parents. It also rules out the dependence of political decisions in one generation on
expectations about political decisions in future generations.
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the second term is the disutility of eﬀort. For simplicity, we have assumed a Cobb-
Douglas aggregator over consumption and bequests, with α ∈ (0,1) now corresponding
to the fraction of wealth allocated to bequests. As in the benchmark model, the cost of
eﬀort is quadratic, and β
i
t parametrizes “laziness”. Finally, the constant 1
(1−α)1−ααα is an
innocuous normalization.





t =( 1− τt)y
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t + Gt, (18)


















t represents, as before, innate talent, which is independent of family history. To the
extent that productivity reﬂects child-rearing, education, and other shorts of parental




noise, which captures luck (or other unworthy income) within the life of the agent.
5.2 Market outcomes and fairness
Household i in generation t chooses consumption, bequest, and eﬀort (ci
t,k i
t,e i
t) so as to
maximize utility (16) subject to the budget constraint (18), taking political and social
outcomes (τt,Ωt) as given. It follows that the optimal consumption and bequests are
c
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which give utility ui
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t + τtyt] − ei
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26Introducing a production complementarity between parental investment, ki
t−1, and individual eﬀort,
ei
t, would complicate the algebra, but would not alter our qualitative ﬁndings.
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Since wealth in one generation depends on bequests and partent investment from
t h ep r e v i o u sg e n e r a t i o n ,w h i c hi nt u r nd e p e n do nw e a l t hi nt h ep r e v i o u sg e n e r a t i o n ,
the wealth of any given individual depends on the contribution of talent and eﬀort and
the realization luck, not only during his own lifetime, but also along his whole family
tree. We thus need to adjust our measures of fair outcomes for the propagation of luck
through intergenerational transfers. Assuming that bequests and parental investments
are considered fair only to the extent that they reﬂect eﬀort and talent, not pure luck, we
deﬁne fair outcomes as the luck-free counterparts of consumption, bequests, and wealth:
b ci
t =( 1− α)b yi
t, b ki
t =( 1− α)b yi
t, and b yi
t = Ai
tei
t + b ki
t−1. Iterating the latter backwards, we
infer that the fair level of wealth is given by the cumulative eﬀect of talent and eﬀort












Similarly, the residual between actual and fair wealth is the cumulative eﬀect of luck:
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all i, which implies that Ωt measures the distance between actual disposable wealth and







t are uncorrelated with each other, which ensures that b yi
t and yi
t−b yi
t are also uncorrelated,
we obtain
Ωt = τtVa r(b y
i
t)+( 1− τt)Va r(y
i
t − b y
i
t). (26)
Once again, this implies that the optimal tax rate is bound to decrease with the signal-
to-noise ratio in the wealth distribution
On the other hand, the equilibrium signal-to-noise ratio now reﬂects the whole history
of the economy. From (22) and (23), b yi
t =
P
s≤t αs−t(1 − τs)δ
i




















The signal-to-noise ratio is thus decreasing in τs for every s ≤ t. That is, how fair the
wealth distribution is in generation t depends, not only on the policies chosen by the same
generation, but also on the policies chosen by all past generations s ≤ t − 1. As o c i e t y
that had a history of high distortions will tend to have inherited a rather unfair wealth
distribution, which makes it more likely that it favors aggressive redistribution in the
present. As a result, unfair outcomes and high distortions can be self-propagating across
generations, opening the door to multiple steady states.
5.3 Multiple steady states
We look for ﬁx e dp o i n t ss u c ht h a t ,i fτs = τ for all generations s ≤ t − 1, then τt = τ is






t are i.i.d. across
i but fully persistent across t,27 with Va r(δ
i
t)=σ2
δ and Va r(ηi
t)=σ2
η. Let τs = τe for all
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which are formally identical to conditions (12) and (14) in the benchmark model. The only
diﬀerence is that τe now represents the history of past policies rather than the anticipated
same-period policy. Letting ∆ = δ −δm and normalizing δm =2 ( 1−α), the utility of the
median voter in generation t is given by
U
m
t =( 1− ατ
2
e) − (1 − α)τ
2
t +[ 1− ατe − (1 − α)τt]τt∆ − γΩt, (30)
which is again formally identical to condition (13) in the benchmark model. We conclude
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Proposition 3 When all generations before t have chosen τe, the optimal tax for gener-
ation t is τt = f(τe;E),w h e r e
f(τe;E) ≡ argminτ∈[0,1]
©








Comparing the above with Proposition 1, we see that the functional form of f is
identical to that in the benchmark model. The only diﬀerence is that f now represents
the best reaction of a given generation against a stationary history of past policies, rather
than the best reaction against same-period market expectations. Hence, the ﬁxed points
of f now represent the steady states of the economy.
Proposition 4 A steady state always exists and corresponds to any ﬁxed point of f, where
f is given by (31). If γ =0 , there is a unique steady state. If instead γ>0, there genericly
exist multiple steady states. The steady state with the lower tax is the one with the highest
inequality but also the highest signal-to-noise ratio.
The example of Figure 2 can thus be directly reinterpreted in the present context,
provided we read τ as the policy in some given generation and τe as the history of policies
in all previous generations. Multiple steady states exist when the social desire for fairness
is suﬃciently high and the relative eﬀect of luck is moderate. The two extreme intersection
points give the two stable steady states. USis characterized by persistently lower taxation,
lower distortions, and fairer outcomes as compared to EU, but EU might be preferred
behind the veil of ignorance.
We conclude that diﬀerent historical experiences may have lead Americans and Euro-
peans to diﬀerent steady states, in which diﬀerent social beliefs and political outcomes are
self-reproducing. Also, these results suggest that reforms of the welfare and regulatory
state, no matter which direction they favor, may need to be large and persistent to be
politically sustainable. In practice, this means that governments need to persuade that,
although such reforms may generate rather unfair outcomes in the short run, they will
not be reverted in the near feature and they will ultimately ensure fairer outcomes for
future generations.
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Remark. In writing (23), we assumed that the society wishes to correct the cumulative
eﬀect of pure luck, but otherwise parents are fully entitled to make diﬀerent transfers to
their children deriving from diﬀerent levels of eﬀort. However, the society may not want to
keep children born by unworthy parents responsible for their parents’ laziness and lack of
care. There is then a conﬂict between what is considered fair vis-a-vis parents and what
is considered fair vis-a-vis children. As a result, the society may like to make parents
only partly entitled to leaving diﬀerent bequests to their children, even if these diﬀerences
reﬂect diﬀerent levels of eﬀort or parental care, so as to further equalize opportunities
across children. In the Appendix, we consider a simple extension in which children are
entitled only to a fraction λ of fair bequests. The positive feedback from past to current
policies remains for any λ>0 and the multiplicity survives for λ suﬃciently high.
6C o n c l u s i o n
Although we focused on income taxation and redistribution, the demand for fairness may
have similar implications for many other policy choices, such as the regulation of product
and labor markets. Our analysis thus sheds some light on why diﬀerences in attitudes
towards the market mechanism are so rooted in American and European cultures. In
Europe, opportunities for wealth and success have been severely restrained by class dif-
ferences at least since medieval times.28 A tt h et i m eo ft h ee x t e n s i o no ft h ef r a n c h i s e ,t h e
distribution of income was perceived as unfair because it was generated more by birth
and nobility than by ability and eﬀo r t .T h e“ i n v i s i b l eh a n d ”h a sf r e q u e n t l yf a v o r e dt h e
lucky and privileged rather than the talented and hard-working. Europeans have thus
favored aggressive redistributive polices and other forms of government intervention. In
the “land of opportunities,” the perception was instead that those who were wealthy and
successful had “made it” on their own. Americans have thus chosen strong property pro-
tection, limited regulation, and low redistribution, which in turn have resulted to fewer
distortions, more eﬃcient market outcomes, and a smaller eﬀect of “luck”. Today, the
28Marx and Engels had already identiﬁed in the lack of a feudal period as one of the reasons why in
the United States it would have been much harder to create a Communist party committed to wealth
expropriation. See Alesina and Glaeser (2004) for more discussion.
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“self-made man” remains very much an American “icon”; and Americans remain more
averse to government intervention than Europeans.
In this paper, the deﬁnition of fairness was embedded in individual preferences. One
may think of such preferences for fairness as a metaphor for a social norm that supports
a socially preferable outcome.29 Alternatively, one can interpret “luck” as the eﬀect of
corruption, rent seeking, political subversion, theft, fraud, and the like — activities that
involve private but no social beneﬁts, and may thus be naturally treated by society as
“unjust”.30 Finally, Amador, Angeletos and Werning (2003) consider an extension of the
Mirrlees paradigm with two types of privately-observed idiosyncratic shocks, one which is
desirable to insure (taste shocks) and another which is undesirable to insure (self-control
shocks). Although their environment is very diﬀerent from ours, one of their results is
reassuringly similar: The optimal level of redistribution tends to decrease with the ratio
of the variance of self-control shocks to the variance of taste shocks, which could be
interpreted as the ratio of fair to unfair inequality. It remains an open question why
societies consider some sources of income as “fair” and others as “unfair”.
Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 . Conditions (2), (10), and (11) imply that, in equilibrium,
the level of consumption and the cost of investment and eﬀort for agent i are















2 +( 1− α)(1 − τ)
2¤
δi
29See Cole, Mailath and Postlewaite (1992) for how diﬀerent social norms may result in diﬀerent
reduced-form preferences.
30For example, Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1991, 1993) and Angeletos and Kollintzas (1997) discuss
how corruption and rent seeking can be detrimental for economic growth. See the working-paper version
of this article for a variant of our model where “luck” is replaced by a rent-seeking activity.
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with Ω as in (14). It follows that
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and therefore 2δ>max{δi} suﬃces for preferences to be single-picked in τ for all agents,
in which case the median voter theorem applies. In any event, we assume that the policy
maximizes the utility of the median voter. Evaluating (32) for i = m,u s i n gηm =0 ,
∆ = δ − δm, and the normalization δm =2 , gives (13).
Next, deﬁne W(τ,τe)=( 1− ατ2









η−τ [1 − ατe − (1 − α)τ]∆;
and foc(τ,τe)=∂W




∂τ2 =2 ( 1 −α)(1+∆)+2γ
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0. By implication, the ﬁrst-order condition is both necessary and suﬃcient, in which case
τ = f(τe) is the unique solution to foc(τ,τe)=0 . Note that foc(τ,τe) is a third-order
polynomial — unless γ =0 , in which case it reduces to a linear relation).
Of course, if γ = ∆ =0 , it is immediate that f(τe)=0for all τe ∈ [0,1]. If instead
γ>0 and/or ∆ > 0, it is easy to check that foc|τ=0 = −2γσ2
η − ∆(1 − ατe) < 0, which












If instead γ>0, the ﬁrst-order condition is a third-order polynomial in τ. Closed-
form solution is thus possible in principle, but it turns out to be so complicated that it is
useless for comparative statics. We thus opt to analyze the solution implicitly. It is easy
to check that
∂foc
∂ση = −2(1 − τ),
∂foc
∂σδ =2 γσ2
δ[1 − ατe − (1 − α)τ][1 − ατe − 2(1 − α)τ],
and
∂foc
∂∆ = −[1 − ατe − 2(1 − α)τ]. By the Implicit Function Theorem, it follows that
∂foc
∂ση > 0 necessarily. On the other hand,
∂f
∂σδ < 0 ⇔
∂f








1−α{[1 − α − (1 − 2α)γσ2
η] − α[1 − α + γσ2
η]τe} and note that
τ<1−ατe
2(1−α) if and only if h(τe) > 0. Since h0(τe) < 0, there exist a unique b τe such that
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η) . For γσ2
η suﬃciently
small, b τe > 1, in which case τe < b τe is trivially satisﬁed for all τe ∈ [0,1]. We conclude
that
∂f
∂σδ < 0 and
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∂∆ > 0, unless both γσ2




∂τe =0 . Therefore, α suﬃciently large is necessary for the






δτ {[2 − 3(1 − α)τ] − ∆/γ}.










τe=0 > 0; that is, f is initially increasing in τe.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 . That f has at least one ﬁxed point follows immediately
from the fact that f is bounded and continuous. First, note that τ = τe =1implies
∂W
∂τ =( 1− α)(2 + ∆) and thus, for any ∆ ≥ 0,f (1) < 1 if and only if α<1. Therefore,
α<1 is necessary and suﬃcient for τ =1not to be a ﬁxed point. Next, note that
Proposition 1 established that f is non-increasing in τ for either γ =0or α =0 .I t
follows that f has a unique ﬁxed point whenever γ =0or α =0 , and by continuity
also when γ or α are suﬃciently close to zero. For γ and α suﬃciently high, on the
other hand, f is increasing over some portions, which opens the door to multiple ﬁxed
points. The example in the main text is a generic example in which f has multiple
ﬁxed points. Simulations suggest that multiple equilibria tend to exist for intermediate
values of σδ/ση. The comparative statics of the equilibria with respect to σδ and ση
follow directly from the comparative statics of f (see Proposition 2 again). Finally, in
equilibrium, Va r(yi)=( 1−τ)2σ2
δ +σ2
η and Va r(b yi)/V ar(yi − b yi)=( 1−τ)2σ2
δ/σ2
η, which
are both decreasing in τ.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3a n d4 . In the main text we showed that the preferences over
τt in the dynamic model coincide with the preferences over τ in the benchmark model.
The results then follow by implication of Propositions 1 and 2.
Equalizing opportunities for children. Let λ ∈ (0,1) be the fraction of fair parental


















1 − λ can be interpreted as a measure of the social desire for equalizing opportunities
across children. If τs = τe for all s ≤ t − 1, the above reduces in equilibrium to
b y
i
t ≡ (1 − τt)δ
i









The steady-state analysis goes through as before, simply replacing α with αλ. Normalizing
δm =2 ( 1− αλ)/(1 − α), and letting ∆ =0for simplicity, we conclude that the optimal
















This economy is thus isomorphic to the benchmark economy provided we replace α with
αλ. It follows that the possibility of multiple steady states remains as long as λ is not
very small. Moreover, the tax rate in any (stable) steady state is decreasing in λ; that is,
redistribution increases with a higher desire to equalize opportunities across children.
Remark. We have considered only one kind of taxation and redistribution, namely
income taxation coupled with lump sum transfers. Diﬀerent redistributive goals given a
desire for fairness could be achieved by using a mixture of diﬀerent tax and redistribution
instruments. For example, we can introduce an inheritance tax in addition to the income
tax. A society may then consider an inheritance more or less “fair” depending on whether
higher bequests are or are not due to higher ability and eﬀort by the previous generation.
Similarly, one could consider public provision of education. Our model would predict
that, in an attempt to correct for the more unfair variation in children’s opportunities,
Europe adopts a larger government intervention in education.
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Reproduced from Alesina, Gleaser and Sacerdote (2001). This scatterplot illustrates the positive 
cross-country correlation between the percentage of GDP allocated to social spending and the fraction 



































































































 20%             40%             60%               80% 
percentage who believe that luck determines income Table 1 




Source: Total social spending is social spending as a percentage of GDP, from Persson and Tebellini (2000); 
original source: IMF. Majoritarian, presidential, and age structure are from Persson and Tabellini (2002). Ethnic 
fractionalization is from Alesina et al (2002). Mean belief that luck determines income is constructed using 
World Value Survey data for 1981-97 from the Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan. This 
variable corresponds to the response to the following question: “In the long run, hard work usually brings a 
better life. Or, hard work does not generally bring success; it’s more a matter of luck and connections.” The 
answers are coded 1 to 10. We recoded on a scale 0 to 1, with 1 indicating the strongest belief in luck. 
Robust t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Dependent variable: Social spending as percent of GDP 
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0.496 Table 2 
The effect of belief that luck determines income on individual political orientation 
(individual data) 
 
Dependent variable: Being left on the political spectrum 
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Observations 20269  16478  14998 
R-squared 0.03  0.03  0.04 
 
Source: The dependent variable is constructed using data from the World Value Survey. It is a 0 to 1 indicator 
for whether the respondent classifies himself/herself as being on the left of the political spectrum. The question 
is formulated as follows: “In political matters, people talk of left and right. How would you place your views on 
this scale, generally speaking?” The respondent is given a scale 1 to 10, 1 being the most leftist. We classified as 
leftist anyone who answered with a score of 5 or below. All other individual characteristics are also from World 
Value Survey. 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
  
 











The figure depicts the relation between the tax rate that agents anticipate ex ante (horizontal axis), and 
the tax rate that the society finds optimal ex post (vertical axis). The solid curve represents an 
economy where the effect of luck is moderate as compared to talent and effort. An equilibrium 
corresponds to any intersection of this curve with the 45-degree line. There are two stable equilibria, 
one with low taxation, high inequality, and low injustice (US), and one with high taxation, low 
inequality, and high injustice (EU). The lower dashed line represents an economy where the effect of 
luck is very small, in which case only the low-tax regime survives. Finally, the upper dashed line 
represents an economy where luck dominates, in which case only the high-tax regime survives. 
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